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I.

Introduction and Research Motivation

This study seeks to further examine the connection between executive-auditor
relationship and the occurrence of fraudulent accounting. This has been a contentious
issue in the field of accounting for many years, but came into the spotlight after the
meltdowns of companies like Enron and WorldCom in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
At the core of these disasters was, at the very least, questionable accounting and, in many
cases, accounting fraud.1 In some cases, independent auditors turned a blind eye to
blatantly inaccurate and misleading financial statements which deceived investors,
regulators, and the general public. These deceived parties rapidly became fixated on the
relationship between the companies and their independent auditors who signed off on
their fraudulent financial statements. Questions surfaced about the nature of their
relationship: Can you reasonably expect an auditing company that is employed by a firm
to disagree with the firm’s management decisions? Was the economic bond between the
companies so strong that auditors would ignore their professional duties in exchange for
continued business and/or higher fees from the company? Could anything be changed
about the accounting profession to ensure that such events could never occur again?
Some felt that the system needed reform in order to proceed.2 Other people felt that the
rules in place were adequate—Enron and other companies just failed to follow the rules.3
In response to public outrage about the accounting scandals of the late 1990s and
early 2000s, the government made several changes with regard to company-auditor
1

D. A. Moore, "Conflicts of Interest and the Case of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction and Strategic
Issue Cycling," The Academy of Management Review 31, no. 1 (2006), 10.
2
Mark W. Nelson, "Ameliorating Conflicts of Interest in Auditing: Effects of Recent Reforms on Auditors
and their Clients," ((July 11, 2005).).
3
A. H. Catanach, "Enron: A Financial Reporting Failure," Villanova Law Review 48, no. 4 (2003), 1057.
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relationship. In 2000, Congress mandated the issuance of a proxy statement which
disclosed the type and amount of fees paid to independent auditors.4 In November 2000,
the SEC introduced Final Rule S7-13-00 which sought to alter auditor independence
requirements. The new Rules defined independence as “a mental state of objectivity and
lack of bias” and demanded that the auditor be independent both “in fact” and “in
appearance”.5 There were four considerations for determining independence.
Independence was said to be impaired when: “1) the auditor has mutual or conflicting
interest with the audit client; 2) the auditor audits the auditor’s own work; 3) the auditor
functions as management or an employee of the audit client; or 4) the auditor acts as an
advocate for the audit client”.6 Many felt that these measures were not sufficient to
prevent future crises, so Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter referred to as
SOX or the Act) in July of 2002. SOX is widely considered the most sweeping financial
regulation legislation since the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.7 The Act introduces a
number of rules and makes several rules in place considerably stricter. Some of the
changes include: Harsher penalties for executives that sign off on inaccurate statements,
incentives and protection for “whistleblowers”, and new rules for firm-auditor
relationship.8 Many academics and experts felt that the government acted too quickly
and without first attempting to determine the problems at the root of the accounting
scandals; they felt SOX was “hastily put together in response to several high-profile
4

Marshall A. M. A. Geiger, "Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures." Auditing 21, no. 1 (2002), 67.
Richard M. Frankel et al., The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings
Quality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Sloan School of Management, 2002), 4.
6
ibid., 4
7
I. X. Zhang, "Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002," Journal of Accounting &
Economics 44, no. 1-2 (2007), 75.
8
J. R. Macey, "A Pox on both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the
Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules," Washington University Law Quarterly 81, no. 2
(2003), 350-353.
5
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corporate scandals”.9 The new rules concerning client-auditor relationship are most
relevant to this study.
Under the new rules, audit firms are prohibited from working with a firm if one of the
firm’s executives was employed by the auditing firm “during a one-year period preceding
the date of the initiation of the audit”.10 Additionally, the new regulations include rules
requiring the mandatory rotation of independent auditors. Policy makers suspected that a
lengthy relationship between the firm and the auditor would cause them to form a strong
bond—and auditor professionalism and independence would be compromised.11 A final
relevant provision of SOX puts new restrictions on receiving services from the auditor
and forbids the auditor from providing certain consultancy services and some other
services for an audit client. Under the new rules, any fees for non-audit services greater
than five percent of the total fees paid to the auditor must be pre-approved by the
company’s audit committee.12 Again, law makers and the general public believed that
the economic bond between the two parties had become too strong and that the large
amounts of fees for non-audit services were partly to blame.13
The three variables examined in this study were audit fees, fees for other services, and
length of executive-auditor relationship. Audit fees refer to fees directly related to the
audit of the company by the independent auditing firm. Fees for other services refer to

9

C. C. Leuz, "Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 really this Costly? A Discussion of Evidence from Event
Returns and Going-Private Decisions," Journal of Accounting & Economics 44, no. 1-2 (2007), 147.
10
Macey, A Pox on both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative
Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 352
11
J. V. Carcello, "Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting," Auditing 23, no. 2 (2004), 2-3.
12
Lawrence L. J. Abbott, "An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit
Committees*," Contemporary Accounting Research 20, no. 2 (2003), 219.
13
Macey, A Pox on both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative
Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 352
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any fees billed by the auditor for anything other than the audit. Firms were required to
disclose the first two variables in proxy statements after fiscal year 2000. The intuition
behind the selection of these variables was that they are all possible indicators of the
strength of relationship and economic bond between the firm and its auditor. The fees
may be the fair value of the work performed by the auditor, but it is also possible that a
firm which pays its auditor high fees may be reimbursing the auditor for their stamp of
approval on inaccurate financial statements.
There are opposing theoretical arguments about the effects of these different variables
on auditor independence and therefore the issuance of accurate and honest financial
statements. Much of the literature in this area focuses on the fees for non-audit services
but much of this argument can be extended to audit fees as well. One side of the
argument contends that auditors’ decisions are certainly influenced by the fees paid to
them by their clients. An auditing firm retains business with a firm by pleasing the firm’s
management and the audit team accomplishes this by agreeing with the internal audit
team. Additionally, an auditor with a strong economic bond with their client—caused by
high fees—will have a vested interest in the success of the company and this could cause
“impaired auditor independence”.14 Former chairman of the SEC Arthur Levitt expressed
his concern with the situation in 2000. He was afraid that consulting and other services
from the independent auditor “shorten the distance between the auditor and
management”.15 Levitt also commented that the “broad array of business arrangements”
(in addition to a simple audit) could make the auditor less of a “skeptical professional

14

Michael M. Firth, "The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to their Audit Clients,"
Contemporary Accounting Research 14, no. 2 (1997), 7.
15
Abbott, An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit Committees*, 219
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who must be satisfied before signing off on a financial statement, and more like any other
service vendor who must satisfy the client to make a sale”.16 Concern in this area is not
limited to Arthur Levitt. Professor Michael Firth discusses two reasons why non-audit
fees threaten the independence of the auditor:
“1) the audit firm is unwilling to ‘criticize’ the work done by its consultancy division,
and 2) the audit firm does not want to lose lucrative consultancy services […] and is
therefore more reluctant to disagree with management’s interpretation of accounting
matters”.17
The counter argument asserts that there is no connection between fees paid to the
auditor and the occurrence of accounting fraud—and argues that higher fees may in fact
lead to lower likelihood of accounting fraud in some situations. They assert that one
would expect high audit fees, when company size and complexity is controlled for, to be
correlated with a lower occurrence of accounting fraud. This is because larger amount of
fees implies that the auditor spent more time and effort in examining the financial
statements and therefore they are more likely to catch errors. Similarly, they would argue
that high fees for other services from the auditor are also less likely to lead to accounting
fraud. These fees are an indication of the auditor’s increased knowledge of the firm and
therefore they are more likely to issue accurate statements the first time.18 In effect, there
is a positive “knowledge externality” created when the auditor provides joint services for

16

M. A. Geiger, "Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Auditor Reporting on Stressed Companies." Auditing 22,
no. 2 (2003), 55.
17
Firth, The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to their Audit Clients, 7
18
Anup A. Agrawal, "Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals*," The Journal of Law & Economics
48, no. 2 (2005), 377.
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the client.19 These arguments only defend the fees assuming that restatements occur
because of honest mistakes by the firm and auditor, but this side of the argument also
accommodates the possibility that the mistakes were purposeful. For example, an
independent auditor receiving a high amount of fees for other services will not want to
risk the possibility of losing this client. Essentially, they have a “good thing going for
them” and do not want to lose it by approving a statement which they know to be
incorrect.20 Additionally, some have argued that firms will naturally keep their level of
other fees from their auditor at an appropriate level because they know the public will be
concerned about the appearance of non-independence.21
This argument extends to the issue of length of relationship between the executive
and the auditor. One could argue that a) a longer relationship between the two firms
would increase the auditor’s knowledge of the firm and therefore it is less likely that they
will miss inaccurate information in the financial statements and b) clients are difficult to
obtain and retain and therefore a company would not want to risk losing a long-term
client (either by action of clients pressured to distance themselves from auditor or by
action of the government) by approving a financial statement they know to contain false
information.22 It is also possible that, under mandatory rotation rules, auditors will feel
stronger pressure to “capitulate to clients’ wishes” because the new rules will lead to
“intra-firm rivalries among accountants, as new accountants compete for higher client
satisfaction survey results than their predecessors [who didn’t have to follow the new
19

Dan A. D. A. Simunic, "Auditing, Consulting, and Auditor Independence," Journal of Accounting
Research 22, no. 2 (1984), 680.
20
Michael M. Firth, "Auditor-Provided Consultancy Services and their Associations with Audit Fees and
Audit Opinions," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 29, no. 5&6 (2002), 663.
21
Frankel et al., The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality, 26
22
Abbott, An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit Committees*, 221
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rules]”.23 A former SEC Chairman, Roderick Hill, shared his opinion with the United
States Senate during 2002:
“Forcing a change of auditors can only lower the quality of audits and increase their
costs. The longer an auditor is with a company the more it learns about its personnel, its
business and its intrinsic values. To change [auditors] every several years will simply
create a merry-go-round of mediocrity”.24
Some argue that the auditor’s decision to approve a false statement is essentially a
cost-benefit analysis and is self-governing in that the costs almost always outweigh the
benefits. The costs in this case include loss of reputation, lawsuits, and possible
restrictions by the SEC concerning future conduct; the benefits include retaining business
and possibly receiving higher fees from the client.25 Loss of reputation in the industry, or
“reputational capital” is devastating and therefore the auditor will not want to “jeopardize
it to satisfy the demands of any one client”.26 Reputation is extremely hard to establish
and makes the auditor more professionally appealing to clients who want to demonstrate
to investors and the government that they are trustworthy and accurately audited. The
auditor’s reputation, in the opinion of one author, is essentially “serves as a collateral
bond for independence”.27

23

Macey, A Pox on both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative
Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 353
24
Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 3
25
Abbott, An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit Committees*, 221
26
R. M. Frankel, "The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management,"
The Accounting Review 77 (2002), 72.
27
Mason Gerety and Kenneth - Lehn, - the Causes and Consequences of Accounting Fraud, Vol. - 18: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., - 1997), 590.
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This study provides increased and unique investigation into this area of concern.
The restatements included in this study come within a pivotal period for accounting
practice in the United States. Starting with fiscal year 2000, firms were required to
disclose the amount they paid their independent auditor in audit fees and fees for other
services. The U.S. Government did not require disclosure of audit fees, audit-related
fees, tax services, information technology services, and non-audit services before this
year.28 The most recent cases used were from fiscal year 2002. Events after this date
were not used because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in June, 2002. This act was
directed at some of the alleged causes of accounting fraud addressed in this empirical
study, including independent auditor tenure and fees for audits and non-audit services.
The act did not take effect until the first fiscal year-end report after November 15, 200429,
so feasibly this study could have included events from fiscal year 2003. This study chose
to exclude events from this year, however, because it is very possible that firms,
conscious of the regulations and in anticipation of the act taking effect, would alter their
behavior for this fiscal year. (Further study could determine whether this in fact was the
case).
Additionally, this study approaches the length of relationship in a novel way.
Instead of using the independent auditor’s length of relationship with the firm, this study
defines tenure as the length of relationship between the executive at the firm and the
independent auditing firm. This approach was prompted by the idea that independent
auditors’ level of comfort with a company is determined by their interaction with the
management of the firm. This study is important for several reasons. As mentioned
28
29

Agrawal, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals*, 379
Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 75
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above, there is still controversy in the accounting profession over the necessity and
effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This study, in using a unique sample group,
seeks to determine if the rules imposed by the act are correctly focused on the true causes
of accounting fraud. There is inherently a cost on firms when more regulations are
imposed. The auditing process becomes difficult when these rules are in place, and this
costs firms time and money. Of course, no one would disagree that the new rules were
appropriate−provided they effectively addressed the true causes of fraud. The negative
effects of the collapse of companies such as Enron and WorldCom were catastrophic and
therefore it is not surprising that the government stepped in to reform the rules. But if
empirical studies show that some of the new regulations were unnecessary, then the
government should rethink their application because of the costs they place on
companies.30 The ultimate objective of this study is to determine whether the data
supports the restrictive legislation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The implications of the
results from this study are useful to government regulators in their approach toward rules
for company-auditor relationship.
The results of this investigation show no significant correlation between a) audit
fees and b) fees for other services from the independent auditor, and the likelihood of an
SEC-prompted restatement. The results do indicate a negative correlation (at the 5%
significance level) between length of executive-auditor relationship and the likelihood of

30

I. X. Zhang, "Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002," Journal of Accounting &
Economics 44, no. 1-2 (2007), 75.
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such a restatement. This finding is consistent with the findings of Carcello, who defines
tenure as length of firm-auditor relationship.31

II.

Literature Review & Hypotheses

The large amount of literature and past studies on this topic of firm-auditor
relationship and its effect on the reliability of financial statements indicate that it is a
topic of high interest and controversy in the accounting profession. There are numerous
studies which examine this relationship in different ways. They examine, among many
other things, the effect of auditing committee composition, corporate governance, and
auditor tenure with the firm. There is an underlying question present in each of the
studies: Is there a conflict of interest inherent in an auditor’s relationship with a firm?
The most relevant prior studies—as they relate to the study at hand—will be discussed
briefly in this section.
It is not surprising that many of the past studies in this area are related to the
connection between non-audit services from the auditor and a lack of independence,
because one of the largest effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 dealt with this
issue.32 In one study in the United Kingdom, a positive correlation between audit fees
and consultancy services was determined. This indicates that two common measures of
firm-company relationship are correlated. The author notes that this correlation
approaches zero when one controls for firm specific events such as mergers, acquisitions,
or bankruptcies. This implies that these events most likely act as a third variable which
31
32

Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 55
Geiger, Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures., 54
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causes both high audit costs and high consultancy costs from the independent auditor.
Additionally, the results of the study indicate that high non-audit service fees are
associated with clean audit reports—meaning that the auditor supposedly found no error
to report. The author proposes two potential reasons for the relationship. First, it is
possible that there is a lack of auditor independence. An auditor whose independence is
impaired “may be more inclined to give a clean audit opinion when a qualified report is,
in fact, appropriate”.33 Firth also notes the possibility that the consultancy services were
necessary to clear up uncertainty or disagreement prior to the audit. He admits that,
regretfully, the study cannot distinguish between the two possible causes, however, and
therefore cannot conclude that high non-audit services are associated with less
independence of the auditor.33 Another United Kingdom study by the same researcher
sought to determine the connection between companies with high-agency costs and the
amount of non-audit services. Companies with high-agency costs always require
independent auditors to approve their financial statements and are very concerned with
reassuring their creditors and investors of the security of the company. This study
questions whether companies which have such a large concern with appearing honest and
trustworthy to their investors will choose to purchase smaller amounts of non-audit
services to be, or at least appear, independent of their auditor. The results from the
observation of 500 companies show that companies whose agency-cost proxies were
higher would choose to purchase smaller amounts of non-audit services.34 These findings
are corroborated by the results of a 2003 study. This study looked for a connection
between the characteristics of the audit committee and the amount of non-audit service
33

Firth, Auditor-Provided Consultancy Services and their Associations with Audit Fees and Audit Opinions,
687
34
Firth, The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to their Audit Clients, 1-21
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fees (as measured by the ratio of non-audit service fees to normal audit fees). The idea
behind this study was that firms which are wary of their appearance of independence to
investors and creditors, as made evident by very independent auditing committees, may
also choose to keep their non-audit service fees small to further promote the image of
independence. The findings in this study show a significant negative relationship
between audit committees comprised of only independent directors (commonly
considered healthy for independence) and non-audit service fees.35 These findings
support the argument discussed in the introduction that the appearance of independence is
so important for companies that they would not risk tainting this with large amounts of
non-audit services.
A 2002 study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology also investigates the
possible effects of non-audit services. This study sought to find the connection between
fees for auditor’s non-audit services and earnings quality. Like the present study, this
investigation gathered auditor fee information from proxy statements which were
required after 2000, and presented evidence that firms which purchased more non-audit
services from their auditor were more likely to barely meet or beat analysts’ forecasts—
an important objective for companies. This proxy may indicate suspicious action by the
auditor because they allowed a financial statement which conveniently just met the
benchmarks desired by the firm’s management. The SEC has expressed concern that the
desire to meet analysts’ expectations and “project a smooth earnings path creates pressure
on auditors to permit their clients to meet those objectives”.36 The authors conclude that
their findings support the argument that the provision of non-audit services by the
35
36

Abbott, An Empirical Investigation of Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Audit Committees*, 215-234
Frankel et al., The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality, 15
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independent auditor strengthens the economic bond between the parties.37 A related
study by the same author examined the relationship between auditors’ fees for non-audit
services and a) earnings management and b) market reaction to the disclosure of fees.
The evidence in this study showed a positive correlation between non-audit fees and
small earnings surprises, and a negative correlation between audit fees and small earnings
surprises. The results also show a negative correlation between fees for non-audit
services and stock values on the day of the disclosure—though the effect is small.38
A 2003 study sought to determine the relationship between audit fees and nonaudit fees, and the audit reporting for stressed companies in the manufacturing industry.
The idea behind this study is the possibility that, when companies are financially stressed
and would highly benefit from a favorable financial statement, the amount of the fees
paid to the auditor will encourage them to “see things the client’s way”.39 The results
show a significant positive correlation between the amount of fees paid for audit services
and the likelihood of receiving a going-concern modified audit opinion. This finding
suggests that high payments for audit services may lead auditors to give a good opinion
for the company’s financial statements—at least for manufacturing companies. This
study found no such correlation for non-audit services which suggests non-audit services
do not have an adverse effect on the judgment of independent auditors.39
A 2004 study by Carcello was prompted by the new SOX regulations to
determine if mandatory firm rotation would reduce the occurrence of auditing fraud by
limiting the length of auditor tenure with a firm. This study examined data on firms
37
38
39

Frankel, The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management, 71
Frankel et al., The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality
Geiger, Auditor Tenure and Audit Reporting Failures., 53
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which committed fraud between 1990 and 2001 by matching them with non-fraudulent
firms and looking for a connection between independent auditor tenure and the
occurrence of accounting fraud. According to the results, fraudulent accounting is most
likely to occur in the first three years of the auditor-client relationship. No evidence from
this study suggests that longer auditor tenure is correlated with a higher likelihood of
accounting fraud and therefore the author of the study opposes mandatory firm rotation.40
The dependent variable proxy for the study at hand was chosen based on its
usefulness as an indicator of suspicious accounting behavior and also its availability. The
companies included in the sample all filed a restatement at some point between 2001 and
2003. These restatements were not called for by the internal audit team or the
independent auditor. In a study by Agrawal, the connection between corporate
governance and accounting scandals was examined to see if there was a conflict of
interest innate in some corporate governance systems which led to accounting fraud. As
a proxy for accounting scandals, this study used the issuance of restatements using the
rationale that “serious accounting problems tend to be self-unraveling and force a firm to
revise its financial statements. Under this assumption, a restatement is synonymous with
the incidence of a serious accounting problem”.41 The logical argument against this
methodology would contend that restatements cannot be unequivocally considered a bad
thing. It is true that a restatement could be an indication of foul play by the firm, but the
company could also have made an honest mistake in the initial statement which the firm
or auditor later realized. For this reason, this current study chose to take the proxy
requirement a step further so it would be more likely that the accounting activity was
40
41

Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 55
Agrawal, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals*, 402
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fraudulent. The companies included in our sample did not call for the restatement; the
restatement was demanded by the SEC. It is possible, however, that the companies
accidentally missed the issue throughout the process, though it is less likely.
The literature on this subject, as well as prior studies and economic intuition, led
to the development of three hypotheses for the three variables being considered: Amount
of audit fees, amount of fees for non-audit services, and length of relationship between
the CEO and the independent auditing firm.
For Audit Fees (X1):
H1: There will be no correlation between the amount of fees paid for audit
services and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement.
The Carcello study discussed above indicated a correlation between audit fees and
receiving a positive audit opinion from the independent auditor, but this study considered
financially stressed companies only.42 A positive opinion is extremely important when a
company is in a volatile financial situation. One should note that the study at hand did
not control for being in a financially stressed position. This is unlikely to be an issue
because it is improbable that many (if any) of the firms in the study were in dangerous
economic positions. Therefore, it is predicted that there will not be a correlation between
amount of audit fees and an SEC-prompted restatement.

42

Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 55
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For other fees from the auditor (X2):
H2: There will be a negative correlation between the amount of fees paid for other
services from the independent auditor and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted
restatement.
The rationale behind this hypothesis is that the independent auditor does not want to risk
this additional income from the firm by allowing a questionable restatement. The
spotlight of suspicion will be directed at the auditor-firm relationship in the event that
they miss or ignore incorrect information in the original statement.43 Additionally, higher
fees for other services could indicate a strong knowledge of the company being audited
so mistakes are more likely to be caught by the independent auditor.44
For CEO-auditor tenure:
H3: There will be a negative correlation between CEO-auditor tenure and the
occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement.
A related study by Carcello for the firms from 1990-2001 showed no correlation between
these variables. Similarly, as with the variable discussed in the second hypothesis, there
is an argument that longer relationship means that the auditor knows the firm and its
management more intimately and therefore is unlikely to make a mistake. Additionally, a
longer relationship means that the auditor is content doing business with the firm and

43
44

Geiger, Audit Fees, Nonaudit Fees, and Auditor Reporting on Stressed Companies., 56
Frankel et al., The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings Quality
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may be less likely risk that business by approving a financial they know contains an
error.45

III.

Methodology

The first step in this process was to select the firms for the sample group using a
proxy for accounting fraud. This proxy used was based on a list of fraud cases from 1995
to 2007 from the website of Professor Caskey at UCLA Andersen School of
Management.46
As discussed in the introduction, the range of years from which to gather incidents
of fraud was intentionally short. It included restatements from fiscal years ranging from
2000 and 2002. The information for the companies used was from the fiscal year prior to
the year in which the restatement occurred as was consistent with a 1997 study by Gerety
and Lehn.47
Professor Caskey’s list shows restatements for companies from this period. The
list indicates who prompted the restatement. The options were: a) “Company”: This
meant that the restatement was called for by the company’s internal auditors; b)
“Auditor”: This meant that misstated information was either missed or ignored by the
internal auditors but was noticed by the independent auditors and they called for the
restatement; c) “SEC”: The misstated information was either missed or ignored by both
the internal and external auditors and the SEC had to call for the restatement. A previous
45

Carcello, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 55
Caskey, Judson. <http://personal.anderson.ucla.edu/judson.caskey/data.html
47
Gerety and - Lehn, The Causes and Consequences of Accounting Fraud, - 587-- 599
46
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study on the effect of audit firm tenure and accounting fraud defined fraud as “being
charged with a violation of Rule 10(b)-5 by the SEC”.48 This study, however, drew its
sample from the years 1990-2001. This proxy for fraud could not be used for the current
study because the usable range of years is much shorter. If the proxy used by Carcello
were used in this study, the sample size would be so small that any findings could not be
deemed statistically significant. The final criterion for companies, whose restatements
were prompted by the SEC and whose date of restatement fell within the desired range,
was the exchange in which the company was traded. Only companies traded in the
NYSE or NASDAQ were used. The size of this original sample group was 60
companies. The list also indicated whether the issue for the restatement was related to
revenue recognition. For ten of the companies in the final sample group, the restatement
concerned revenue recognition.
The next step was to gather the desired information for each company. This
included: CEO tenure with as executive, audit firm tenure with the company, audit fees
for the years desired, and fees for all other services from the independent auditors. CEO
name and tenure were discovered using Bloomberg’s “Management Feature”. If the
company was not listed in this feature then the company’s 10-K statement for the year
was examined. This statement includes the date when the CEO joined the firm. Through
Bloomberg’s “Company Filings” feature, each company’s DEF-14 proxy statement was
examined. This statement included name of independent auditor, audit fees paid to this
company for the fiscal year, and fees for other services paid to this company. Many
companies included the year they began working with their external auditors. If they did
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not list this information then proxy statements from previous years were examined to
determine the exact year the firm began using the external auditor. “Tenure” in the study
was the length of the CEO-auditor relationship so the lesser of CEO tenure and auditor
tenure was used (i.e. the length of time both parties had been with the company). “Audit
fees” are explicitly stated in the proxy statement. The other fee section was for
information technology services. For a few companies, the remaining fees were
separated into “audit-related”, “tax-related”, and “non-audit service (NAS)” fees.
Because only a few companies had information technology fees, and the other categories
were not usually separated, they were all aggregated into a category called “Other Fees
from Independent Auditor” for the data purposes. For companies with a mid-year fiscal
year end, an average of the two years was used. Finally, in order to match with a firm,
Standardized Industrial Classification (SIC) code and total assets (for the fiscal end of the
desired year) were also obtained. The sample size at this point was 28 companies.
The next step was to match each company with a company that did not have to
issue a restatement in the period considered. Previous studies support this as an empirical
method because “it provides a natural control for industry and size-related effects in our
returns analysis”.49 The companies were matched on the two criteria used in several prior
studies. The first criterion was industry; the matched firm needed the same first two
digits of SIC. The second criterion was size as defined by total assets.47 The firm with
the same first two digits of SIC code and with the smallest absolute value for
[Restatement firm’s total assets – non-restatement firm’s total assets] was selected as a
match. Using this process, the control group selection was absolutely objective. At this
49
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point, one more firm, Tyco International, was excluded from the study because there was
no firm within its industry with similar total assets. The data for several control
variables was then gathered for the 27 sample firms and their matches. This data was
obtained from Bloomberg and included the number of employees, the amount of sales,
and the book-to-market ratio at the end of the desired fiscal year.
Regression
The regression includes the variables of audit fees, fees for other services, and length of
relationship along with several control variables.
SEC = b0 + b1 AUDFEE + b2NAFEES + b3TENURE + b4TA + b5MKTCAP +
b6XCHNGE + b7EMPLOY + b8BGFIVE + b9BKMKT
Where:
SEC = Dummy where which assigns a 1 if the company had a restatement prompted by
the SEC and a 0 if otherwise.
AUDFEE = Audit fees divided by total assets for year in question.
NAFEES = Total of all other fees for services by the independent auditor, divided by
total assets.
TENURE = The lesser of the length (in years) of the auditing firm’s relationship with the
firm and the CEO’s tenure at the firm as chief executive.
TA = Natural log of the total assets in millions USD at the end of the year.
MKTCAP = Natural log of the company’s market capitalization at the end of the fiscal
year.
XCHNGE = Dummy variable which assigns 1 if company was traded on NYSE and 0 if
otherwise.
EMPLOY = Number of employees at the fiscal year end.
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BGFIVE = Dummy variable which assigns 1 if one of Big Five auditors and 0 if
otherwise.
BKMKT = The company’s book-to-market ratio at the end of the year.

The Dependent Variable
Dependent variable is a dummy value used as a proxy for possible suspicious accounting
activity. Companies which had restatements called for by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (meaning that the statements passed the internal and independent auditors)
were assigned a 1. The companies in the control group had a 0 for this value. This proxy
does not indicate whether the internal and independent auditors accidentally missed the
issue that was misstated or whether the firm and auditors purposefully ignored the issue.
Regressors
The regressors in this study were audit fees (AUDFEE), fees paid to the auditor for other
services (NAFEES), and length of relationship between the CEO and independent auditor
(TENURE). In accordance with prior studies, the units for relationship length were
years.50 Audit fees and other fees were divided by total assets to express them as relative
to company size.51 This is an inherent control for industry in this study because company
matching was determined by Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code.
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Control Variables
As in prior similar studies, multiple control variables were included in the regression to
reduce omitted variable bias. These variables were used in previous studies with similar
regressions. Included in this regression were control variables for size including
variables for total assets, market cap, and number of employees. The rationale behind
controlling for size was that larger companies could have lengthier and more complicated
financial statements which could cause the internal and independent auditors to miss an
error. A consideration for whether the company was traded on the NYSE was included
because two prior studies mentioned stricter audit rules typical of this exchange—which
could lead to a more time consuming and therefore expensive audit.52, 53 A variable
representing whether or not the auditor was a Big Five auditing firm (BGFIVE) was also
included to determine if this was correlated with the dependent variable. A prior study
indicates that these firms are “quality-differentiated suppliers” and suggest a negative
relationship between retaining a Big Five firm for auditing and the incidence of fraud.54
The final control variable was the companies’ book-to-market ratio (BKMKT) at the end
of the fiscal year−a proxy for growth. This variable was included as a control because
one would expect companies that are growing at a fast rate to “face greater pressure to
maintain high growth rates”.55 A positive relationship between book-to-market and the
dependent variable was therefore expected.
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IV.

Data & Results

The matching process was successful in that an appropriate industry peer was
determined for all but one of the companies. As mentioned previously, the exception was
Tyco International, which had far more total assets than the nearest company with the
same two-digit SIC code and therefore was excluded. Of the 27 matched, 10 were
matched to a company with the same four-digit SIC code. The average difference in total
assets for a matched pair was $233.2 million. 13 of the 27 companies, however, had a
difference in total assets of less than $20 million and the average percentage difference in
total assets was approximately 17%.
The three variables examined in this study were audit fees, fees for other services,
and length of relationship between firm CEO and the independent audit company. No
correlation was predicted for amount of audit fees and the occurrence of an SECprompted restatement. A negative correlation was predicted for the amount of fees for
other services and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement. The t-statistic, and
corresponding p-values, for the variables of audit fees and fees for other services from the
independent auditor did not achieve any level of significance, indicating that one cannot
conclude that their true coefficients differ from zero. Therefore, based on the sample
used, this study does not indicate any correlation between any kind of fee paid to the
independent auditor and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement.
Only one of the variables in the regression demonstrated a significant correlation
with the occurrence of an SEC-prompted restatement. The regression shows a
correlation, right at the 5% significance level, between length of the CEO-auditor
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relationship and the occurrence of a restatement prompted by the SEC. Influenced by the
results of past studies, the researcher in this investigation correctly hypothesized a
negative correlation between CEO-auditor tenure and the likelihood of an SEC-prompted
restatement. The coefficient for the variable of length of relationship is -0.041, the tstatistic is -2.00 and the corresponding p-value is 0.051.
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Table 1. Companies included in the sample group and their matches based on SIC code and total assets

Restatement prompted by SEC

Ticker

HOMESTAKE MINING
CONAGRA FOODS INC
ANIKA THERAPEUTICS INC
LECROY CORP
BRIGHTPOINT INC
PAULSON CAPITAL CORP
PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES INC
ZILA INC
PAR PHARMACEUTICAL COS INC
GEMSTAR-TV GUIDE INTL INC
NVIDIA CORP
PHOTON DYNAMICS INC
XEROX CORP
ALLIANT ENERGY CORP
CRAFTMADE INTERNATIONAL INC
RESTORATION HARDWARE INC
WILLIAMS-SONOMA INC
ANNUITY AND LIFE RE HOLDINGS
TALX CORP
GERBER SCIENTIFIC INC
ENTERASYS NETWORKS INC
EDISON SCHOOLS INC
MASSEY ENERGY CO
NANOPHASE TECHNOLOGIES CORP
IDT CORP-CLASS B
UNUM GROUP
CPI CORP
AMERCO

HM
CAG
ANIK
LCRY
CELL
PLCC
PPD
ZILA
PRX
GMST
NVDA
PHTN
XRX
LNT
CRFT
RSTO
WSM
ANNRF
TALX
GRB
ETS
EDSN
MEE
NANX
IDT
UNM
CPY
UHAL

Fiscal Year
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002

SIC
1041
2038
2836
3825
4812
6211
8111
2834
2834
3651
3674
3823
3861
4911
5063
5719
5719
6311
7373
7373
7373
8211
1222
3999
4813
6321
7221
7513

Total Assets ($ mil)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

1,419.38
12,295.80
28.98
100.85
687.79
31.55
77.77
75.60
216.93
9,341.51
1,016.90
158.64
27,645.00
6,237.93
59.13
233.87
891.93
2,310.77
34.00
478.41
750.04
394.50
2,241.43
20.01
1,607.92
45,259.50
172.72
3,732.32

Matched Control Group
SOUTHERN COPPER CORP
SARA LEE CORP
EPIX PHARMACEUTICALS INC
BADGER METER INC
GENERAL COMMUNICATION INC-A
SIEBERT FINANCIAL CORP
FTI CONSULTING INC
DIADEXUS INC
NABI BIOPHARMACEUTICALS
MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC
FINISAR CORPORATION
DIONEX CORP
RAYTHEON COMPANY
ONEOK INC
MOORE HANDLEY INC
COST PLUS INC/CALIFORNIA
TRANS WORLD ENTERTAINMENT CP
MERCURY GENERAL CORP
INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE INC
COGNEX CORP
CERNER CORP
DEVRY INC
ARCH COAL INC
RONSON CORP
YOUNG BROADCASTING INC-A
AFLAC INC
MAC-GRAY CORP
DOLLAR THRIFTY AUTOMOTIVE GP

Ticker
SCCO
SLE
EPIX
BMI
GNCMA
SIEB
FCN
DDXS
NABI
MU
FNSR
DNEX
RTN
OKE
MHCO
CPWM
TWMC
MCY
ININ
CGNX
CERN
DV
ACI
RONCQ
YBTVQ
AFL
TUC
DTG

Fiscal Year SIC
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002

1021
2053
2835
3824
4813
6211
8111
2834
2836
3674
3674
3823
3812
4923
5072
5719
5735
6331
7372
7373
7372
8221
1222
3999
4833
6321
7215
7514

Total Assets ($ mil)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

AVERAGE

1,770.56
11,611.00
29.68
98.02
679.01
40.64
146.13
53.37
314.62
8,363.20
1,030.00
173.68
26,636.00
5,853.30
49.03
252.87
1,002.00
2,316.54
43.51
406.90
712.30
391.68
2,182.81
12.89
892.58
45,058.00
174.63
2,100.37

Difference in Assets

Percentage diff.

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

351.18
684.80
0.70
2.83
8.78
9.09
68.37
22.23
97.70
978.31
13.09
15.05
1,009.00
384.62
10.10
18.99
110.07
5.77
9.51
71.50
37.74
2.82
58.62
7.12
715.34
201.50
1.90
1,631.94

24.74%
5.57%
2.42%
2.80%
1.28%
28.82%
87.91%
29.40%
45.04%
10.47%
1.29%
9.49%
3.65%
6.17%
17.07%
8.12%
12.34%
0.25%
27.98%
14.95%
5.03%
0.72%
2.62%
35.60%
44.49%
0.45%
1.10%
43.72%

$

233.17

16.91%
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Table 2. Regression results
SEC = b0 + b1 AUDFEE + b2NAFEES + b3TENURE + b4TA + b5MKTCAP + b6XCHNGE + b7EMPLOY + b8BGFIVE + b9BKMKT

95% Confidence
Interval

Coefficient

Std. Error

T-Statistic

P-Value

AUDFEE

0.0000395

0.0000353

1.12

0.269

[-0.0000315,
0.0001105]

OTHER

0.0000355

0.0000472

0.75

0.457

[-0.0000596,
0.0001306]

TENURE

-0.041096*

0.0205004

-2.00

0.051

[-0.0823611,
0.0001692]

TA

0.0102244

0.1019385

0.10

0.921

[-0.1949671,
0.2154158]

MKTCAP

-0.0002963

0.0878193

-0.00

0.997

[-0.1770673,
0.1764746]

XCHNGE

0.0379667

0.1673464

0.23

0.822

[-0.2988841,
0.3748175]

EMPLOY

-1.79e-07

3.55e-06

-0.05

0.960

[-7.33e-06, 6.97e-06]

BGFIVE

0.0677841

0.317318

0.21

0.832

[-0.570944,
0.7065121]

BKMKT

-0.0099403

0.0310772

-0.32

0.751

[-0.0724955,
0.0526149]

_CNSTNT

0.4803447

0.3683867

1.30

0.199

[-0.2611794,
1.221869]
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V.

Conclusion

This study was prompted by the possible existence of an auditor conflict of
interest. The study questioned whether the economic bond formed between the
independent auditor and its client, through audit fees, fees for other services, and a long
length of relationship, could cause the auditing form to either miss or ignore errors or
irregularities in the initial financial statement, leading the Securities and Exchange
Commission to call for a restatement. The results do not indicate any correlation between
either audit fees or fees for other services, and the occurrence of an SEC-prompted
restatement. The findings show a significant negative correlation between one of the
three variables investigated, length of CEO-auditor relationship, and the occurrence of an
SEC-prompted restatement. This finding corroborates the findings of similar prior
studies. This study hypothesized a negative correlation between these variables using the
rationale that length of relationship will a) increase an auditor’s knowledge of the client
so they are less likely to miss an error in the firm’s financial statements and/or b) an
auditor knows the difficulty of initially obtaining, and retaining a business relationship
for a long period of time, and therefore would not want to risk this relationship by
willfully allowing the client to disclose untrue information in a financial statement. A
company risks its professional reputation when it signs off on an inaccurate financial
statement, and auditors who develop a poor reputation for honesty are less appealing to
management teams who want their companies’ financial statements to be received as
honest and reliable.56 History has shown the severe consequences for firms, like Arthur
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Andersen, who violate accounting rules and principles and consequently destroy their
reputation in the industry.57
The idea behind using SEC-prompted restatements as the dependent variable
proxy was that, by accident or not, both the company and the independent auditor missed
the piece of inaccurate information in the original statement. This study does not assert
that these companies purposefully misstated information and then pressured their auditors
to do the same. Further investigation into the actual events or misstatements which
caused the restatements in the sample group could either increase or decrease the
meaningfulness of this study. For instance, if a lengthy investigation of each restatement
in the sample group reveals that the majority of the incidents involved indictment, and
possibly conviction by the SEC then one can more strongly assert that these were cases of
purposeful manipulation of financial statements.
The usefulness of this study lies in its ability to provide recommendations to
lawmakers, financial market regulators, and the public, concerning auditor independence.
These parties are interested in creating a system which will ensure that the disasters—
partly caused by accounting scandals—of Enron, WorldCom, and many other companies
will never occur again. Legislation introduced after these events attempted to ensure the
independence of auditors by including measures designed to limit the strength of the
economic bond between the firms. This study, to the extent that its proxies and sample
size can provide insight, indicates that there is no correlation between a) audits fees and
b) fees for other services, and the occurrence of a SEC-prompted restatement. The study
also indicates a significant negative correlation between the length of CEO-auditor
57
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relationship and the occurrence of a SEC-prompted restatement—which counters the
argument that a longer relationship means the integrity of the independent auditor is more
likely to be compromised.
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